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Some Aspects of United States-Korean
Trade Relations*
Tae Hee Lee**
I.

Introduction

What follows is a general orientation for lawyers to the most
pressing problems affecting United States-Korean trade relations.
Most of these problems are not traditionally legal in the narrow
sense. Instead they result from major differences in Korean and
American economic and political policies, as well as the even greater
cultural and economic differences between the two countries.
I have titled what follows an overview-an aerial photograph of
the terrain-showing the main features of the geography. These features, however, cannot be presented all at once as in a photograph,
but must be presented ad seriatim in writing. I have chosen to proceed in the following order: first, some general remarks on the history of the Korean economy over the past twenty years; second, a
contrast of the ways Koreans and Americans do business and practice law; third, a section to describe the predominant features of governmental economic regulations and policies; fourth, a description of
differences in Korean and American economic interests and policies,
and the problems for United States-Korean trade which these differing interests and policies generate. The more particular problems affecting only a single industry are beyond the scope of this article.'
The problems discussed in this article, however, are those which affect all transactions in United States-Korean trade.
II.

Recent Korean Economic History

The Korean Civil War, which ended in 1953, left South Korea a
devastated country. Agriculture had been destroyed. In most of the
country, hardly a tree was left standing as the result of fighting and
severe fuel shortages. What little industry had existed in the South
* This article was previously published in II KOREAN J. COMP. L. 19 (1983).
** Senior Partner, Law Offices of Lee & Ko, Seoul, S. Korea, Member of Korean and
California Bar; LL.B. 1964, College of Law, Seoul National University; LL.M. 1971, Harvard
Law School; J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School.
1. Examples of some particular problems facing a given industry include reduced exportation of shoes and baseball gloves, and anti-dumping petitions brought against Korean
makers of steel wire nails.
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before the war had been destroyed, and the economic infrastructure,
including most roads, railroads, and facilities for electrical generation, had been demolished. Millions of refugees had fled the communist regime in North Korea, leaving South Korea one of the most
densely populated countries in the world. Postwar struggles persisted
in the form of the residual legacy of the Japanese colonialism which
had suppressed indigenous leadership. In addition, there remained
the ongoing necessity of maintaining a very large defense force to
protect against the threat from the North.
By the early 1960's, a combination of American aid, foreign investment and technology, and Korean entrepreneurship vastly improved Korean education, and literacy and a general devotion to recovery within Korea began to pay off. The economy grew
dramatically. Despite the "oil shocks" of the 1970's and several
worldwide economic recessions, from 1962 to 1980 the Korean Gross
National Product (GNP) grew from 2.3 to 30.6 billion dollars in
constant 1975 dollars.2 This represented an increase of 8.6 percent
per year in real terms, which was one of the highest growth rates of
any country in the world.3 This development took place in a country
of few natural resources where 40 million people live in an area the
size of the State of Indiana."
For such economic development to succeed, Korea needed a
strong cultural base. The goals of postwar Korea were to complete
the transition from a position of total isolation to one of dominance
over an urbanized, industrial economy which had begun less than
one hundred years earlier. Such an economy would have to overcome
the trauma of thirty-five years of Japanese annexation and a savage
civil war. Today, Korea has undergone the type of sweeping urbanization which, like most other developing as well as developed countries such as the United States, has forced masses of demoralized
poor into vast miles of new slum areas. Korea's traditional neo-Confucian culture, however, has been strong enough to weather the
storms of urbanization and industrialization. Conventional ideas of
the proper relationship between the individual and society, the
proper role and function of government, and a lifestyle of low individual consumption have all contributed to Korea's ability to withstand a feverish pace of development. Korean culture has employed
the potentially hazardous processes of urbanization and industrialization to produce an economic miracle.
2. KOREAN ECON. Y.B. 1048 (1982).
3. Per capita GNP in current prices grew during that same period from $87 in 1962,
one of the lowest in the world, to $1636 in 1982, exceeded in East Asia only by Taiwan, Japan,
Hong Kong, and Singapore. Id. at 1050.
4. South Korea has an area of 98,490 square kilometers. Indiana has an area of
93,720 square kilometers.
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Growth in international trade has also played a major role.
From the end of the Civil War to 1972 trade grew substantially, and
in the past ten years, the increase has been even more dramatic. By
1980, Korean imports from the United States rose to $4.89 billion
dollars, from only $585 million in 1970. Korean exports to the
United States underwent similar growth, from $395 million in 1970
to $4.6 billion in 1980.1 Almost without notice, Korea has become a
significant trade partner of the United States. In 1980 Korea ranked
eighth of all nations involved in bilateral trade with the United
States. After Saudi Arabia and Mexico, Korea leads all developing
nations in bilateral trade with the United States.e
There have been a number of developments in United StatesKorean trade in addition to the spectacular growth in the volume of
trade. The most important development has been a substantial shift
in the kinds of goods traded in both directions. In postwar days Korea was heavily dependent upon United States food shipments.7 Today, however, while food remains the United States' largest export to
Korea, 8 its fraction as a function of total trade has been declining.
Far more sophisticated goods increasingly dominate the trade. Korea
is a major consumer of American heavy and precision machinery,
which it has needed for its industrial expansion. Korea has also acquired technologically advanced American products in the fields of
nuclear energy, telecommunications, and large computers. In the
early days, Korean exports to the United States largely consisted of
handicrafts and other light consumer goods. While this area of Korean export trade has grown, particularly in the areas of textiles and
finished clothing, Korea's exports of electronics, chemicals, ships,
and precision parts for a wide variety of industries are also rapidly
expanding. As Korea's economy becomes more technologically advanced, the trend toward exporting increasingly sophisticated goods
to and from Korea is likely to continue.
Korea is dependent upon trade to a degree found virtually nowhere else in the world. Korea has one of the highest population
5.

KOREAN ECON. Y.B. 1148-49 (1981).

6. Though Korea currently has a favorable balance of trade with the U.S., the balance
had been in favor of the U.S. for the past several years. KOREAN ECON. Y.B. 1160-61 (1982).
7. Initially, almost all food shipments were made under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 454 (1954), amended by 7 Agricultural Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977). This Act provides for food assistance on cash
or credit terms to nations in need of such assistance. There are also provisions for emergency
aid for nations faced with extraordinary needs or natural disasters. See generally Note, Public
Law 480, American Agriculture & World Food Demand, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 739
(1978). Initially the shipments were almost exclusively authorized by this law.
8. Food shipments from the United States to Korea consist predominantly of rice and
feed grain. See Han-Jin, The Role of Technology in Economic Development: The Korean
Case, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA: INVESTMENT, TAXATION & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, 693
(1982).
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densities in the world. At the same time, over seventy percent of
Korean land is too mountainous for agricultural purposes. Droughts
in recent years have further impeded the agricultural process. Thus,
Korea cannot produce enough food for its entire population, despite
substantial strides in agricultural development. In addition, because
the war left the country with few trees, Korea must import nearly all
wood and paper products.
The situation is more bleak with respect to nonrenewable resources. Korea is not a major producer of any minerals or metals,
and it produces little or none of most. 9 Korea has little coal, essentially no natural gas, and no oil at all.10 In short, Korea must import
a substantial portion of its food, and essentially all of its energy
needs. To pay the bills, it must export manufactured goods. A full
one third of Korea's GNP consists of exports.1 1 There is no country
the size of Korea or larger which is so dependent on foreign trade.
It cannot be emphasized enough that trade for Korea is essential to its survival. Foreign trade has enabled Korea both to create a
rapidly improving standard of living for its citizens and to eliminate
the need for aid from the United States. The profits from Korea's
heavy foreign trade have enabled the country to hold her own as a
military ally of the United States. Korea matches the United States
in percentage of GNP devoted to defense, and boasts a standing military force which is substantially larger per capita than that of the
United States.1" Impediments to trade strike directly at the heart of
the Republic of Korea's economic and political well-being. She must
trade, that is, she must export, or she will perish.
III.

Contrasts Between Korean and American Legal and Business

Cultures
A.

Language

Language represents the single greatest obstacle in United
States-Korean trade relations. Koreans unfortunately carry nearly
the entire burden of this problem, and Americans often do not appreciate either the extent of this burden, or the problem that it
9. In 1980, total mining production amounted to only $400,000,000, which was less
than one percent of Korea's 1980 GNP.
10. In 1981 Korea's oil imports were equal to more than 10 percent of its GNP. KoREAN ECON. Y.B. 116-61 (1982).
11. The total GNP in 1982 was 66.7 billion U.S. dollars. National Bureau of Statistics,
Economic Planning Board, statistics cited in Business Korea (January, 1984). Exports for the
same year were approximately 21.9 billion U.S. dollars. Office of Customs Administration,
statistics cited in Business Korea (February, 1984).
12. All men, unless exempted because of physical disabilities or exceptionally pressing
family needs, must undergo three years of compulsory military service. They remain in the
reserves until they are 35 years old. The standing army is 650,000 men out of a population of
40 million.
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causes.
One source of the problem stems from the lack of overlap between the vocabularies of the Korean and English languages. The
vocabulary of European languages, such as Italian and German, is
often similar to English. Not so with English and Korean. Furthermore, Korean grammar and English grammar differ radically. English syntax is almost the complete opposite of Korean syntax. This
total reversal of word order creates severe difficulties in listening
comprehension for a Korean, even for a Korean with considerable
English language skills. Thus, in face-to-face negotiations, such as
those encountered typically in business ventures, the Korean often
cannot comprehend precisely what the American is saying. Although
all Koreans study English for six years in secondary school, this
study does not include English conversation. Even those Koreans
who have had private tutoring are rarely able to adequately bridge
the language barrier.
Interpreters could ease the burden for Koreans. Competent interpreters familiar with legal or business technicalities, however, are
not easily found. The interpreters who are available are quite costly,
and the use of interpreters more than doubles the usual amount of
time required for discussions and negotiations. Furthermore, interpreters often introduce a sense of formality and remoteness into situations for which informality and close personal contact are essential.
As a result of such linguistic impediments, Korean-American
business negotiations too frequently waste a great deal of time, and
generate as much mutual misunderstanding as understanding. For
example, American businessmen will often summarize the day's discussion on a particular presentation in English and present it to the
Koreans. The Koreans may then realize the extent to which what
has been said is not what they wanted to say only upon review of the
summary. The Koreans may then try to retract their original response at the next session, much to the anger and frustration of the
Americans. Regrettably, the realization that there has not been a
full meeting of the minds often comes only after the contract is
signed and performance is underway.
Even when the Koreans comprehend what is being said in the
discussion and negotiation stages of a business deal, they encounter
difficulty in replying. To some extent this is due to cultural inhibitions (to be discussed below) against personal confrontation.' 3 To
13. "It is characteristic of Korean culture that in emotional and evaluative orientation
disputes, conflicts and revolutions are conceived negatively, and harmony and equilibrium are
conceived positively." Dai-Kwon Choi Western Law in a TraditionalSociety Korea, in BusINESS LAWS IN KOREA; INVESTMENT, TAXATION & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 34, 61 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Choi]. Choi provides an excellent analysis of the five antinomies around which
tensions, conflict, interactions, and interrelationships between Western formal law and social
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some extent this recalcitrance is also due to the disadvantage of having to speak in a language as foreign to Koreans as is English. As a
result of the inability of the Koreans to provide adequate response,
the Americans often do not understand the position of the Koreans,
or they misinterpret silence as assent. Thus, Koreans often find
themselves helpless to negotiate their position. In order to close a
deal they accept a contract that does not clearly state their intent.
Although six years of secondary school English is not sufficient
to enable most Koreans to speak fluent English or to adequately understand the English language, six years of study usually provides
reading comprehension. The long, complex documents that American lawyers frequently produce, however, simply cannot be read and
understood "on the spot." Neither can proposals for amendments or
for modification be immediately understood, especially when made
during the time pressure of negotiating sessions. Korean businessmen
must study such business memoranda for long hours to adequately
comprehend what has been written. Worse yet, many older Koreans
in high executive positions cannot read English at all. Consequently
they often order their young subordinates to produce Korean translations-a task far more difficult and time-consuming than simply
reading English for personal understanding.
B.

Attitudes Toward Confrontation and the Sanctity of Contract

To compound the linguistic barriers described above, other cultural differences often go unnoticed by the parties themselves. Two
businessmen, one Korean and one American, who wear the same
Western business suits and who have the same familiarity with international industry, often assume that their business perspectives are
as similar as their outward appearances.
The most significant difference between the two businessmen is
in their respective attitudes toward direct personal confrontation.
Americans tend to be direct and to the point, unless there are tactical reasons for being intentionally indirect or vague. Although the
rudiments of the Korean language allow for direct and precise presentation, Koreans seldom use the language in this manner. Even
when speaking English, Koreans tend to do so in an indirect manner.
Despite the suspicions of most Americans, the subtleties of the Korean language are nothing more than a manifestation of the Korean
penchant for avoiding personal confrontation.
The translation of this attitude is often styled "face." The less
clearly and directly a statement is made, the less chance there is that
it can be contradicted or faulted. Koreans instinctively do not want
structure evolve.
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to "lose face" by being contradicted or faulted. Thus, Koreans generally do not consider a vague or evasive statement or writing inferior to that of a clear, direct statement or writing. Beyond the personal desire to avoid losing face is the additional desire to avoid
causing another to lose face. Even when he is right, therefore, a Korean hesitates to point out another's wrong. If he must do so, however, it is done, after much hesitation, in as indirect and subtle a
manner as possible.
Another way to view face is as concern and respect for one's
colleagues, which one expects to be reciprocated. Koreans value
"good vibes" much more than Americans. Koreans wish business to
be pleasant as well as profitable, so they strive for "harmony" and
"good relations" with business colleagues. 14 For example, in business
transactions Koreans do not strive to reach a finely tuned agreement
that anticipates all possible contingencies, such as termination or default. Rather, Koreans prefer a business relationship in which
problems are resolved as they arise, if they arise at all. If problems
do not arise, then the time and agony of trying to provide for them
in advance in the contract "American style" has been avoided altogether, and rightly so, in Korean eyes.
A corollary of the Korean's reluctance to anticipate all unpleasant possibilities is his willingness to address problems as they arise,
to change course accordingly, and to provide the time and effort necessary to effect a smooth transition. The American viewpoint, on the
other hand, is to plan in advance and to exchange desired changes
for concessions in other areas. Koreans often change course during a
business venture precisely because they have not planned carefully in
advance, and they assume that the other party involved will understand their requests for unilateral changes when the need for such a
change becomes apparent. For Koreans, the spirit of a contract is
much more important than the letter, in accord with the emphasis on
harmony and good relations from the beginning."
C. The Role of Lawyers
Law and lawyers do not play a major role in Korean society."
By contrast, the legal system is an integral part of American life.
14. "In interpersonal transactions such as negotiations, mediation, and conciliation, and
in formal official and legal settings, faithfulness, loyalty, 'face,' disgrace, apology, begging
humbly, and repentant attitudes are extremely important." Id. at 53.
15. "Contract cannot be relied upon to achieve the intended results. Adherence to a
contract according to its terms will last while the contract works to the benefit of both parties." Meyer, The Legal Process in Korea, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS
IN JAPAN & EAST ASIA 342, 343 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Meyer).
16. Korea has less than two percent of the number of lawyers per capita than the

United States.
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American culture is largely based on national use of the English language and a complex politico-legal system. To be an American, one
must be a United States citizen and profess ideals embodied in the
United States Constitution."7 To be a Korean, however, is to be a
member of a Confucian tribe, which has occupied its ancestral lands
for centuries, and to have a daily life that is governed by family
obligations and social custom.'" In Korea, litigation is a last resort,
and those involved are frowned upon. Lawyers are simply not part of
the Korean businessman's daily life.
The virtual absence of lawyers from Korean business negotiations exacerbates the linguistic and cultural differences previously
discussed. Most documents for Korean-United States business transactions are drafted by American lawyers. The Korean party generally negotiates on the basis of the documents, encountering the burdens and limitations previously discussed. A Korean lawyer is
engaged only when there is pressure from the American to do so.
This is especially true when American banks are involved. Even
when a Korean lawyer becomes involved, his or her role is often little
more than that of a rubber stamp.
Even if the Korean businessman really wants a lawyer's advice,
cultural limitations frequently inhibit effective face-to-face, detailed
consultation.' 9 Such face-to-face consultation may be embarrassing
when it reveals that the Korean business itself has not adequately
defined its needs and desires, or that the Korean lawyer is generally
inexperienced in the particular area of business concerned.
Furthermore, Korean lawyers are not inclined to become involved in detailed negotiations. Korean lawyers, unlike the typical
American lawyer, are not comfortable with the Socratic method of
problem analysis. A Korean lawyer's training follows the continental
European civil law tradition. This training consists of study, lectures,
and the written analyses of data. 0 A Korean lawyer is not trained to
elicit facts from his client, but rather to rely on those facts which the
2
client has chosen to reveal. '
The same hesitancy to probe that which is not immediately apparent is also encountered when a lawyer is consulted in a potential
litigation matter. Korean companies often seek legal counsel when a
dispute arises, even if the dispute has not yet reached the formal
litigation stage. The lawyer's role, however, is still often limited to
See S. P. HUNTINGTON, THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY (1982).
See generally Byoung Ho Park, Traditional Korean Society & Law, in BUSINESS
LAWS IN KOREA: INVESTMENT, TAXATION & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 3 (1982).
19. See Meyer, supra note 15, at 13.
20. See generally Dainow, The Civil Law & the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 419 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Dainow).
21. Id. at 429.
17.
18.
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general advice based on piecemeal documents offered by the client.
Face-to-face discussions, research of facts, and strategy sessions simply do not lie within the frame of reference of most Korean lawyers
or clients.
Korea's legal system has not developed at the same rapid pace
as her economic status. At the recent GATT2 2 talks in Geneva, Switzerland, the United States proposed the removal of barriers to international trade in services, as well as those in manufactured and agricultural products. 3 Legal advice was one of those services. Thus, to
respond to the American proposal, Korean lawyers would have to
begin competing internationally, just as Korean manufacturers currently must compete.
The author encourages American corporations to consider employing Korean lawyers trained in the United States to represent
them in Korea." American lawyers are also encouraged to base Korean-American contract negotiations on Korean proposals. This
would provide a check on negotiations conducted in English, and it
would help to ensure that the contract embodies the mutual intentions of the parties. The goodwill and harmony generated by the
willingness of an American company to utilize a Korean contract
proposal can only enhance Korean-American business relations.
D. Korean and American Systems of Law
One must keep in mind that the notion of the law as an autonomous body of rules or standards that must be obeyed despite any
conflict with moral standards or custom was introduced in Korea by
the Japanese less than 100 years ago.2 5
Two major bodies of Korean law are significant from the viewpoint of United States-Korean trade relations. The basic civil and
commercial codes conceived by the French and the Germans and introduced by the Japanese are generally complete, well-integrated,
and internally coherent. 6 Nevertheless, like all civil law codes, they
consist of general principles of law with little specialty. In more mature civil law systems, legal codes are expounded on by scholarly
treatises and even case law, although the latter carries much less
22. General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Geneva, Switzerland, April 1979.
23. See generally Symposium on the Multilateral Trade Agreements 11, 12 LAW &
POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 1 (1980).
24. In Seoul there are few Korean lawyers who have received legal training in both
Korea and the United States. These lawyers are members of the Korean bar and they belong
to one or more state bars in the United States. Sound policy would seem to dictate that the
Korean Government increase this group of lawyers as rapidly as possible.
25. Law in the Western sense is still a stranger to Korean culture. See INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF KOREA, Chapter 1 (Sang Hyun Song ed. 1983).
26. See Choi, supra note 13, at 35.
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weight in civil law systems than in common-law systems."
Korean courts and lawyers are faced with the dilemmas created
by only thirty-five years of Korean political and legal history and
little accumulation of either scholarly treatises or cases. The historical gaps create uncertainty for all parties.
Determination of the law in the area of economic regulation is
far more difficult than the challenges presented by either the application of codes to actual cases, or the legal interpretation offered in
case law and treatises.2 Unlike the traditional codes which comprise
a more or less complete picture, and one which is at the same time
internally consistent, the economic regulatory laws are a
hodgepodge, borrowed from all over the globe, but predominately
from Japan and the United States, as well as a variety of other nations. 9 Thus, the economic regulations are internally inconsistent
and do not form a complete, coherent whole.
A further problem for foreign companies is presented by the
rough hierachical division of the various bureaucracies of the governmental ministries. The higher echelon is often staffed with American
trained personnel, able to communicate well in English, who are
aware of American legal ideals. The lower levels, however, are typically staffed with Koreans with no experience abroad, and who have
had only six years of secondary school English studies with emphasis
primarily on reading comprehension. It is the lower level personnel,
however, who develop the details of economic policy and apply them
to actual cases. Unfortunately, this often takes place without any
real communication with foreign companies, and consequently is
done in a narrow, somewhat xenophobic manner.
At this point, the American reader may be resolving that he will
never allow the interpretation of any contract he negotiates to be
controlled by Korean law. Prior to such a determination, however,
one should consider the American legal system from the point of
view of the Korean businessman. If Korea has a paucity of law, the
United States has a fecundity of law. The complex and unpredictable character of the American legal system with its fifty separate
sovereign states and its federal government is unequaled in the
world. It has an independent judiciary, which hands down decisions
following the latest trends in social and economic theory, as well as a
plethora of federal and state regulatory bodies. Another disadvan27. See Daninow, supra note 20, at 15.
28. See Lee & Callaway, Foreign Exchange Controls in Korea & Their Impact Upon
International Commercial Transactions, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA: INVESTMENT, TAXATION & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 246 (1982).
29. For example, Korean labor laws were adopted from the United States despite differences between labor conditions and the labor movement in the United States and Korea. As
a result, application of these apparently similar laws differs between the two countries.
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tage of the American legal system from a Korean perspective is the
exorbitant cost involved in a legal proceeding. Litigation from halfway around the world is not a realistic possibility for most Koreans
unless millions of dollars are involved. From a purely economic
standpoint, few Korean businessmen could realistically afford to
have American law control contract negotiations if they actually believed litigation were a serious possibility. This reality should be considered when American lawyers participate in negotiating a contract
drafted as if its provisions were actually going to be litigated.
The author would urge Americans to realize that they are
among the most aggressive and direct peoples in the world. American lawyers often negotiate as if they were preparing for an inevitable lawsuit. As previously discussed, Koreans generally prefer any
alternative to the disgrace associated with litigation. Thus, the system of arbitration is fairly highly developed in Korea. Specifically,
Korea acknowledged receipt of American arbitration awards in 1957
through the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty with the
United States.30 Korea and the United States are both signatories of
the United Nations Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 3 ' In addition, since 1966 Korea
has had a detailed Arbitration Act which both permits parties to a
dispute to set their own terms for arbitration and provides terms not
specifically agreed upon by the parties.3 2
It is the author's opinion that the negotiation of any United
States-Korean contract will be enhanced by agreeing at the beginning of negotiations to adopt a detailed arbitration clause. The advantages of arbitration over litigation are numerous, and include understandable, flexible, and informal procedures, confidentiality,
reduced costs, and the possibility of a compromise not available in a
court of law. 33 Careful consideration of an arbitration clause in a
contract ensures the parties that the arbitrators will be knowledgeable individuals in whom both parties have confidence.3 4
Zealous American lawyers invariably over-negotiate contracts
with Koreans. Their enthusiasm for anticipating all contingencies
would be better directed at careful drafting of the arbitration
30. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States-Korea, art. V, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2221, T.I.A.S. No. 3947.
31. Convention for the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
32. See Song Kun Liew, Commercial Arbitration in Korea With Special Reference to
the UNCITRAL Rules, 5 KOREAN J. COmP. L. 69 (1977).
33. See generally McLaughlin, Arbitration & Developing Countries, 13 INT'L LAW.
211 (1979).
34. For details in drafting, see McClelland, International Arbitration: A Practical
Guide for the Effective Use of the System for Litigation of Transnational Commercial Disputes, 12 INT'L LAW. 83 (1978).
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clause.3 5 Provisions for partial arbitration should also be a priority.
Careful attention to the use of an arbitration clause should enable
lawyers to incorporate procedures into their contracts by which the
parties can reconcile differences and preserve business relations despite disagreement.
E. Contrasts in the Relation of Business to Government and in the
Organization of Business
Koreans and Americans have very different views of the nature
and role of business in society. Business, both manufacturing and
trading, lies at the heart of the American culture. Even American
society is viewed as a contract. It is a contract between individuals in
which each agrees to give up certain natural rights in exchange for
an organized society.36 The federal form of government in America
is itself the result of an agreement between the various sovereign
states. Furthermore, the real business of America is business. The
archetypal American is the small entrepreneur. Even the American
farmer regards his land as a commodity, not as the burial place of
his ancestors.
Unlike in the United States, until very recently, Korean
merchants were considered the lowest class of free men in society,
ranking far below scholars or the aristocracy, or even peasant landholders. The Korean Government, therefore, tried to avoid entanglements with business interests to the greatest extent possible. On the
other hand, there is a long tradition of governmental monopolies over
such commodities as salt and silk in Korea. Government control of
industrial development in Korea is further extended by Korean support for the Confucian concept of government leaders as "benevolent
fathers." It is felt that the role of governmental heads is to lead the
masses along the path of righteous behavior in order to ensure a
strong and fruitful nation. Thus, it is not surprising to observe that
in modern Korea the growth of business is viewed as a national effort
requiring constant and conscious control by the State. Economic betterment in Korea is neither the happy consequence of many individuals struggling to better themselves nor the result of an invisible hand.
Instead, economic betterment is viewed as an accomplishment of the
entire nation, requiring sacrifices from all.
Americans and Koreans also harbor radically different attitudes
toward concentrated economic power. From the Sherman Act" to
35. The notion of having the Korean contract proposal control might be one provision
in a carefully drawn arbitration clause.
36. For an examination of individualism in the American context and its economic and
political consequences, see L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
37. Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § I
(1982)).
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the Windfall Profits Tax on oil conglomerates,"8 American legislatures, responsive to their electorates, have responded to interlocking
trusts and large corporations as threats to the traditional American
values of political and economic equality, personal freedom, and individualism. 39 The ideal American businessman is not the manager
employed by a large corporation, but the entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur builds a mighty corporation, he becomes an object of admiration. Such admiration, however, is tempered with suspicion. Thus,
when the American entrepreneur actually exercises the economic
power he has created, he will be viewed at best a tycoon, at worst, a
thief.
The typical Korean has no aversion to concentrated economic
power nor is his self-esteem affected by the wealth and power of
those other than himself. He would like to be promoted within the
hierarchy to which he belongs, and he is often very ambitious in pursuing this goal. However, he does not challenge the existence of the
hierarchy itself. He does not regard as a personal affront the requirement that he acknowledge the superiority of those in the upper echelon. The typical Korean unabashedly admires individuals who can
benefit themselves, their families, and their descendants with the
fruits of their labor.
The Korean perspective has fostered a concentration of economic power in Korea unequaled in the United States. Much of Korean industry is organized into major "groups" or loosely structured
conglomerates.4 The largest of these, Hyundai, is still largely led by
the individual who started it. In 1981 the total sales of Hyundai
were over seven billion dollars.4 In order for an American corporation to have the economic significance to the United States that Hyundai has to Korea, such American corporation would have to have
sales in excess of 200 billion dollars.
The decision making power of the individuals in top management who lead these groups is not as restrained by the need for consensus as in a country like Japan.4 2 Korean organizations of any size,
whether they are corporations, law firms, or universities, usually empower an individual similar to a chief executive officer in American
38. 26 U.S.C. § 4986 (1982).
39. "If the concerted powers of this combination are entrusted to a single man, it is a
kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government, and should be subject to the
strong resistance of the State and national authorities." 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
40. "(In 1983) only 8 large conglomerates accounted for half of all (South Korea's)
exports." Newsweek, July 9, 1984 at 9.
41. Hyundai is the largest of four or five similar groups.
42. See Jun Mori, A Practitioner's Perspective on Negotiations & Communication
with Japanese Businessmen, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN &
EAST ASIA 47, 50 (1978).
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corporate structures to make quick decisions and achieve fast results.
This Korean concept of concentrating economic power has had
the practical effect of preventing many commercial disputes in
United States-Korean trade. Each of the nine largest Korean groups
has its own trading company to market the full range of goods produced by the companies in that group. These trading companies generally employ individuals with sophisticated knowledge of international commercial matters, including the full range of potential legal
difficulties likely to be encountered. The expertise of these individuals facilitates quick resolution of disputes which may arise. Indeed,
the existence of these trading companies may be the single most important reason for the avoidance of many commercial disputes between the United States and Korea. However, it is also true that
these large Korean conglomerates, representing a high degree of industrial concentration, both create ongoing problems in current
United State-Korean trade relations as well as represent potential
sources of problems in the future."'
Although Americans are suspicious of concentrated economic
power, they are even more wary of concentrated governmental
power. Americans prefer self-regulation, whether by a governmental
system of checks and balances, or through the advocacy of a free
market and a self-deterministic economic system.
Unlike the United States, Korea has neither a tradition of individualism nor a deep-rooted aversion to concentrated governmental
power. In the past twenty years, Koreans have seen close governmental supervision of the economy produce the economic miracle. Americans, therefore, must expect the Korean Government to be a de
facto third party to any international trade agreement." Korea has
moved in less than one hundred years from agrarian neo-Confucian
feudalism to large scale industrialization without a Renaissance, a
Reformation, or an Age of Enlightenment.
43. These arise largely in the areas of dumping and antitrust. See infra notes 104-11
and 108-117 and accompanying text.
44. A recent report of the Korean Economic Planning Board concluded that of the 697
contracts negotiated between Korean companies and foreign companies between April 1981
and February 1983, 271 were unfavorable to the Korean company. The typical American response would be to congratulate the 271 American companies for their successful bargaining
efforts. The response of the Korean Government was to order the 271 Korean contractors to
correct the terms of the contracts. Restrictions on exports of commodities produced in Korea
with licensed foreign technologies were specifically frowned upon. Such restrictions were out of
line with Korea's commitment to increase exports. Knowledge of Korean economic and social
policies is a prerequisite to successful negotiations with Korean companies. See generally
Chan-Jin Kim, Legal Problems of Doing Business in Korea, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN & EAST ASIA 384 (1978), in which the author analyzes the role of

foreign capital in Korean economic growth in recent years, and discusses several governmental
acts affecting the legal framework of doing business in Korea. See generally BUSINESS LAWS
IN KOREA: INVESTMENT, TAXATION & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Chan-Jin Kim ed. 1982).
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Supervision of Trade by the Korean Government

Before proceeding to problematic areas in United States-Korean
trade, some of the key devices employed by the Korean Government
to help regulate, stabilize, and expand the economy will be enumerated. Awareness of these measures will aid in understanding the specific examples to be discussed in Section V.
A.

Foreign Exchange Control

Under the Korean Exchange Control Act' 5 and subsidiary decrees, strict comprehensive controls are imposed on all foreign exchange transactions involving the South Korean won"' and all import
or export of foreign currency to or from Korea.47 These restrictions
apply to all international business transactions. The purpose of the
restrictions is to stabilize the value of the domestic currency and to
ensure the effective utilization of all foreign exchange funds. ' 8 As a
practical matter, obtaining foreign exchange approval for any business transaction allows the Government to review and withhold approval of any commercial transaction it deems contrary to Korean
business interests.
Both Korean and American business interests will be substantially enhanced when the strength of the South Korean economy
makes it possible for the won to be fully convertible. In the
meantime, some of the foreign exchange regulations do have the
beneficial side effect of protecting foreign companies. For example,
when the foreign concern makes payment in advance, the Korean
company must complete deliveries within six months of receipt of
payment."
The rationale for this rule is twofold. First, the Government
does not want advance payments to become a means of circumventing its approval process for loans to Korean companies. Second,
the Korean Government believes it is vital that all Korean exporters
45. Korean Foreign Exchange Control Act, Law No. 933 (Dec. 31, 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Control Act].
46. For instance, article 5(1) of the Korean Foreign Exchange Control Act states that
the Minister of Finance shall decide the basic exchange rate "between the domestic currency
and foreign currencies ....
" Paragraph (3) of the same article allows the Minister of Finance, with the approval of the President following consideration by the State Council, to
make exceptions to that practice. All of Chapter II of the Act deals with issuance of permits
for foreign exchange transactions. See generally id. at arts. 5-13 and 17-20.
47. E.g., Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Exchange Control Act, amended by Cabinet Decree No. 382 (Jan. 19, 1962); Foreign Exchange Control Regulations, amended by Ministry of Finance Notice No. 261 (Nov. 27, 1964); Foreign Exchange Deliberation Committee
Regulations, Cabinet Ordinance No. 399 (Jan. 24, 1962).
48. See Lee & Callaway, Foreign Exchange Controls in Korea and Their Impact Upon
International Commercial Transactions, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA: INVESTMENT, TAXATION & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 246 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Lee & Callaway].
49. Control Act, supra note 46.
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develop a reputation for reliability. A late delivery by one company
may prejudice other Korean exporters. A violation can lead to sanctions including a ban on the right to export." The threat of a ban on
exports is such a powerful deterrent that Korean companies almost
never violate the six month rule, which in turn protects the foreign
company willing to make advance cash payments. 1
B.

Licensing Requirements

52
1. General Licenses.-Under the Korean Foreign Trade Act,
any corporation or person intending to engage in the business of export/import must obtain a license from the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry (MCI). 3 If a foreigner wishes to engage in trade in
Korea, he must also apply to the MCI which then refers the application to the Foreign Trade Committee for "deliberation." 5' 4 In effect,
although the Government may exclude foreigners from the export/
import business in Korea, a few licenses have been issued. The decilicenses is discretionary, and cannot efsion whether or not to issue
55
challenged.
be
fectively

2. Licenses for Particular Transactions.-A manufacturer
who wishes to export has two choices. He may use a licensed trading
company, or he may apply for a special license himself.5 Regardless
of whether an exporter uses the first or second method, he must obtain a separate license which describes the basic trade terms such as
price, quantity, and subject matter. By the same token, a business
50. See Foreign Exchange- Control Act, Law No. 933, arts. 35-38; Foreign Exchange
Control Regulations, amended by Ministry of Finance Notice No. 361, arts. 19-14 to 19-29.
51. This last example also illustrates the use of foreign exchange control by the Korean
Government to supervise matters having little to do with the usual goals of exchange controls,
such as exporter reliability. If the American businessman or lawyer notes that Korean foreign
exchange controls are a window through which the Government keeps watch over the Korean
economy, the strictness and comprehensiveness of these controls become more understandable,
if not easier to bear. See Lee and Callaway, supra note 49, at 52.
52. Foreign Trade Transactions Act, Law No. 1878 (Jan. 16, 1967).
53. Id. at art. 3. Another aspect of this license requirement provides for licensing of
General Trading Companies (GTCs). GTCs are granted special benefits not provided most
Korean trading companies, such as permission to have extra personnel in overseas offices and
to use revolving letters of credit. In order to be designated a GTC, a trading company must
export more than two percent of Korea's gross exports and have its shares publicly traded.
Presently, there are 10 GTCs which include some of Korea's largest business contingents, such
as Hyundai Corporation, Bando Sangsa (Luckey Group), Daenco Corporation, and Kukje
Corporation.
The predominance and expertise of Korea's large trading companies (which accounted for
about 50% of Korea's exports in 1983) has probably been a significant factor in minimizing
trade disputes between individual parties.
54. Foreign Trade Transactions Act, Law No. 1878 (1967) as amended by Law No.
-3.
1781 (1975) art. 3,
55. There is an absence of normal administrative law procedures in the Korean legal
system. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
56. Trade licenses are granted to only those entities that export products they have
produced themselves.
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that wishes to import must either be a trading company, or it must
acquire a special license. A license is granted only if the imported
item is to be used by the company itself, such as equipment for its
business. A separate license for each transaction must be obtained. 5
3. Classificationof Goods for Licensing Purposes.-The MCI
classifies export and import goods into three categories: (1) goods
earmarked for export or import which are automatically approved;
(2) goods which may be imported or exported subject to approval;
and (3) goods which are prohibited from import or export. This classification should be made annually or biannually, with at least thirty
days notice of any change.5 8 If a contract has been signed but no
letter of credit has been opened or approval obtained, a change in
classification of the type of product in question (for example, from a
good subject to approval to a prohibited good) may prevent either
party to a contract from performance.5 9 In contemplation of this possibility, all contracts in United States-Korean trade should have in
them a force majeure clause.
In the case of goods which may be traded subject to approval,
the MCI has delegated responsibility to the Foreign Exchange Banks
for issuing the separate export or import license mentioned above."0
The licenses may be issued upon the recommendation of either the
relevant government authority6 1 or the relevant manufacturer's
association. 2
4. Export Inspection.-Finally,in order to minimize the quantity of below par exports by Korean companies, a quality inspection
of the goods is required before an export license will be issued. The
types of goods requiring inspection was recently reduced by nearly a
third, from 770 to 564 different types.
C. Price Setting and Adjustments for Orderly Markets
The MCI is given the power to set the price at which a particu57. If a Korean manufacturer chooses to obtain a license through a trading company, it
may be difficult to determine the party liable for non-performance of a contract with the foreign buyer. A GTC with offices in the United States (e.g., Hyundai Corp. or Kukje Corp.)
would be a preferred defendant because of its deep pocket and its susceptibility to United
States jurisdiction.
58. The classification, however, can be changed without notice even though a letter of
credit has been opened in regard to goods, or their export or import has been approved, so long
as the goods remain unaffected by the change. See Foreign Trade Act, Law No. 1878 (1967)
art. 9.
59. Id.
60. Foreign Trade Transaction Act, Enforcement Decree, art. 32, para. 1(2).
61. E.g., such as a recommendation by the Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture for
importation of farming machinery.
62. E.g., such as the Textile Manufacturer's Association in the case of the proposed
importation of machinery for the manufacture of textiles.
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lar good may be exported or imported. 63 This price setting authority
is frequently used to set high export prices to prevent excessive price
competition among Korean exporters. Another common practice is to
set tariffs high enough to prevent the import of certain goods. Of
course, contract prices may be adjusted subsequent to any change in
the government mandated price. In practice, the MCI has delegated
the setting of these prices to particular trading associations.
The MCI is also authorized to make "adjustments" to ensure
the maintenance of order in the export and import of goods." The
MCI is empowered to regulate the conduct, prices, and conditions of
Korean companies bidding for international contracts overseas, and
to adjust the quantities of imports or exports as well as the terms of
agreements relating thereto. Article 22 gives the MCI the power to
intervene and partition markets in situations where, because of excessive competition among Korean exporters, prices are unprofitably
low. 65 It also allows the MCI to control export of goods to particular
countries in quantities that may threaten trade relations."
D. Summary of Government Policy
Korea is resource poor and consequently must import to survive.
At the same time, the Government's policy of rapid economic growth
has forced the adoption of an export promotion policy designed to
increase the size of the domestic Korean market. Thus, both imports
and exports are essential to Korea's economic and social health. This
is true for Korea to a far greater degree than for virtually any other
major nation.67
Export concerns such as quality control, minimization of excess
competition, and export incentives are of fundamental interest to the
Korean Government. The Government desires to control the flow of
imports to protect fledgling industries with export potential, and to
ensure the financial stability of the economy by preventing uncontrolled outflow of foreign currency. Imports unnecessary to national
development are a luxury that cannot be afforded. These controls
evidence the central economic policy of rapid growth through export
promotion. An understanding and awareness of this policy and its
legal ramifications can be of immeasurable value to the foreign businessman who wishes to deal with the Korean business community.
63. See Foreign Trade Act, Law No. 1878 (1967) art. 10.
64. See Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act (1967) art. 22.
65. Id.
66. Id. Recent examples include shoes and steel exported to the United States.
67. One writer has argued that certain industrialized countries are dependent on trade
to a comparable degree, but the advantages they enjoy as advanced economies, with high levels
of capital formation and with trade dominated by capital and technology intensive products, as
well as their position in the European Common Market effectively makes them less dependent.
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Problem Areas in United States-Korean Trade

The earlier contrast of United States-Korean culture and economic regulation provides background for a discussion of several areas of concern for lawyers and businessmen involved with United
States-Korean trade.
A.

Protectionism

The first and most significant group of problems arises because
Korea and the United States are members of the same world economy, and because laborers from both countries compete in the same
labor pool. The current standard of living and wages in Korea are
reminiscent of the United States just after the First World War. A
"good job" in Korean industry pays no more than $3.00 per hour,6 8
and everyone, white collar and blue collar alike, expects to work on
Saturdays. A worker earning $3.00 per hour who works on Saturday
is not impoverished. He is comfortably housed, his family eats well,
he owns a television and he enjoys drinking with his friends after
work. On the other hand, he does not own a car or a boat. He does
not take expensive vacations. His wife does not buy expensive prepared foods. In sum, his lifestyle is comparable to that of an American worker with a "good job" sixty years ago.
In many basic industries, the low cost of Korean labor outweighs the disadvantages of lower productivity per worker and transportation costs. Competing American companies and their workers
have responded with protectionist measures.
1. Korea's Place in the United States Generalized System of
Preferences.-One of the current points of stress in United StatesKorean trade relations concerns Korea's place in the United States
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 9 The GSP was created
by the United States Trade Act of 1974, and it became effective in
1976.70 In brief, the GSP authorizes the President to exempt from
import duties certain eligible products imported into the United
States market from designated developing countries.7 1 Currently, the
United States GSP program grants duty-free treatment to 3053
72
products from 140 different developing countries and territories.
68. $3.00 per hour was high for even skilled workers in machine industries in 1983.
Unskilled workers in small enterprises are paid far less, but they are still efficient, productive
workers. See Park, Wage Determination in the Republic of Korea, (1980) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Cornell University).
69. See Trade Act of 1974 §§501-05, 88 Stat. 2066 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§2461-65
(1975)).
70. Office of U.S. Trade Representative Press Release at 3 (March 27, 1984).
7 1. See generally Note, The Generalized System of Preference: Nations More Favored
Than Most, 8 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 783 (1976).
72. Since implementation of the program in 1976, the value of imports receiving GSP

DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2:2

As a practical matter, the GSP has been a particularly advantageous program for the five countries which have received seventy
percent of the total benefit of the program from 1976 to the current
year, 1984.73 Those countries are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Brazil, and Mexico. These five nations have profited because their
industrial development in the late seventies enabled them to benefit
significantly from such a duty-elimination program.
The Reagan Administration is theoretically committed to encouraging free trade and free market competition. The Administration is also unusually responsive to pressures from American businessmen vulnerable to foreign competition. By Executive Order, the
Reagan Administration instituted a policy of discretionary removal
or "graduation" of a country from the benefits of the GSP, product74
by-product.
Under the original GSP program, a country automatically lost
its preference if over fifty percent of a particular item imported into
the United States came from that country. 75 A country also lost its
preference if its total exports to the United States of that particular
item exceeded a certain amount tied to the United States' GNP. 76
The new system of discretionary graduation by the President
has been added to the older, more certain criteria. The accelerated
pace at which South Korea's exports to the United States are being
graduated from the GSP by executive decree can be regarded as indicative of the view of the United States Congress and the Administration that the GSP program has been aiding countries that really
do not need help. In the words of Trade Ambassador William Brock,
"These changes (discretionary graduation of countries and items
from the GSP) reflect the Administration's recognition of the
achievements of the more advanced developing countries in attaining
a higher level of competitiveness in certain products in the internatreatment has risen from $3.2 billion to $10.8 billion in 1983. GSP imports account for 4% of
total imports into the United States. Office of U.S. Trade Representative Press Release at 3
(Mar. 27, 1984).
73. Id.
74. Exec. Order No. 12,354, 47 Fed. Reg. 13,477 (1982). For the year beginning on
March 30, 1984, South Korea lost duty-free treatment on goods constituting almost
$32,000,000 of exports to the United States in 1983-84. This is in addition to even bigger
losses from earlier years. See Office of U.S. Trade Representative Press Release (Mar. 27,
1984).
75. Trade Act of 1974 §504(c), 88 Stat. 2066 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §2464(c) (1975)).
The President is required to withhold or withdraw preferential treatment if he determines that
a participating country has, during the previous calendar year, exported to the U.S. more than
$25 million worth of an otherwise eligible article or has exported to the U.S. a quantity of an
eligible article equal to or exceeding 50% of the total U.S. imports of that article. A de minimus provision added in 1979 allows the President to waive the fifty percent limit if total U.S.
imports of an item do not exceed a certain monetary amount. For 1981, that amount was
$1,371,017.00
76. In 1983 the ceiling on any particular item from any single country was set at $7.7
million.
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tional marketplace." 77
The procedures for determining whether countervailing or antidumping duties may be imposed are of an almost adjudicatory nature, but securing relief from duties under the GSP or having such
relief denied is a much more informal matter.78 The costs associated
with this informal procedure are numerous. The proposition that the
process of graduation is politically oriented is supported by concessions of the Office of the United States Trade Representative to the
effect that graduation of products is done primarily in response to
petitions filed by American producers or labor unions. 79 The grant of
the petitions is extremely advantageous to the American union or
producers involved in the relevant industry. One must keep in mind
that the advantage of limiting the President's discretion in this area
and having nations lose their duty preferences only when exports to
the United States from any one country exceed a specified percentage of all United States imports of that item is that free trade is
enhanced.
The second major problem of the present informal system of
graduation from GSP benefits is the uncertainty it promotes within
the infant industries of the developing nations. Under the clear criteria of dollar volume of percentage of total imports, a company or a
government could calculate fairly closely when it would lose its dutyfree treatment on a certain item, and it could then decide whether
the increased business would make increased production and export
worthwhile. Under the current framework, however, scenarios such
as the following can easily occur: A nation exceeds the statutory
limit and cuts back its exports to within the limit. The President
then refuses to redesignate the item for GSP treatment, as is within
his discretion.
Because preferential treatment depends on indefinite criteria
and review by the Office of the United States Trade Representative,
developing countries such as Korea cannot plan business expansion
or make intelligent decisions regarding the allocation of scarce manufacturing resources. Regardless of one's views as to the issue of the
duty-free treatment for South Korean products, the criteria for dutyfree treatment should be as certain as possible, with guidelines flexible enough to allow application to a variety of situations. Additionally, such certainty may deter corruption and encourage national
business planning in both Korea and United States.
77. This achievement appears to be one measure of the GSP program's success. See
Office of U.S. Trade Representative Press Release at I (Mar. 19, 1982) (hereinafter cited as
Press Release).
78. See 15 C.F.R. § 2077 (1981)(regulations concerning GSP review).
79. See Press Release, supra note 78, at 4.
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Korea and several other major beneficiaries of the GSP have
profited because they are healthier than many of the other beneficiaries.8 0 Is the philosophy underlying the United States' GSP that a
country no longer deserves preferential treatment when such treatment injures United States industry? Perhaps the philosophy is instead that any underdeveloped country may sell in American markets so long as it is able to overcome the impediments of distance
and cultural disparity?"
Or perhaps the reason Korea is being graduated from the GSP
is because it is not as impoverished as other countries receiving preferential treatment. The author suggests that this will not withstand
scrutiny on moral or economic grounds.
One sophisticated argument to justify graduation of nations
benefiting from the GSP is based on the idea that the United States
should take such decisive action to prevent nations of comparable
economically advantaged positions, such as South Korea, from succeeding in the American market at the expense of even poorer nations. 82 Such an argument, however, departs from the free trade philosophy that is the best defense of the GSP. The GSP should not be
regarded as a subsidy extended by America to poorer nations.8 3 Instead, the perspective should be that the world economy, including
all American consumers, benefits anytime Korea and other developing nations are allowed to sell in America whichever items they can
produce more inexpensively than can the Americans. The best way
for the United States to help nations more impoverished than Korea
is by insisting that Korea and the other relatively wealthy developing
nations open their own markets to the products of the less wealthy
developing nations. No solution will result from barring Korea from
the American markets.8 4
Perhaps the answer to the question of when a nation is suffi80. Those countries are becoming so wealthy and productive that their exports are beginning to have an impact on United States industries and workers.
81. The per capita GNP in Korea is still less than 20% that of the United States.
82. A form of that argument appears in the President's report: First Five Years' Operation of the GSP (1980).
83. Industrialization is a prerequisite to economic development because it creates jobs
in the agricultural sector and raises income per capita in developing countries. This, in turn,
increases demand for goods, which raises the level of imports. See DeBouter, Tariff Preferences Revisited, II J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 353 (1976).
84. For example, if Indonesia, China, or India can sell textiles in Korea more cheaply
than Korean manufacturers, the United States should insist, as the price of completely opening
the American market to Korea, that poorer nations be admitted into the Korean market. The
per capita GN P of Korea, while less than 20% of the United States per capita GNP, is also
more than 300% of the per capita GNP of Indonesia: The same arguments of distributive
justice and worldwide economic efficiency which should lead the United States to extend dutyfree treatment to Korean exports will also require Korea to extend duty-free treatment to
exports from Indonesia. But it is for the United States, the richest, largest and most powerful
trading nation, to set the example in extending duty-free treatment to the exports of poorer
nations.
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ciently developed to lose duty-free treatment can be given in relative
terms; it depends upon who is asking whom for duty-free treatment.
The author would like to suggest what could be entitled the Rule of
Three: Any nation A should extend duty-free treatment to all of the
exports of any nation B, if the per capita gross nationalproduct of
A is more than three times that of nation B.
General acceptance of such a rule would go a long way toward
solving the "North-South" division and would encourage the Third
World to help itself.8" It would not impact on trade between the major developed nations, because none has a per capita income three
times greater than any of the others. As a developing nation would
become richer, it would gradually lose its advantage under the Rule
of Three to all but the very advanced nations. The Rule has the dual
virtues of being so general as to apply to all countries, and so adaptable as to apply to the economic position of any two trading nations.
It provides a definite answer in every case that can be strongly supported by arguments of distributive justice and economic efficiency.
If the Rule of Three can determine when a nation no longer
needs duty-free treatment for its exports, can it ascertain whether
the advanced nations should be free to export to the developing nations? The argument usually goes as follows: If the United States
lowers tariff barriers to Korean goods and thereby injures American
domestic industry, do considerations of fairness and economic efficiency also dictate that duty-free treatment be given in Korea for
products which the United States can make and sell in Korea more
inexpensively than Korean manufacturers? Or, at the least, should
not the United States be freely admitted to Korean markets so long
as it pays duty?
The answer to this question is necessarily no. Protection of both
the social fabric and the infant industries of Korea is necessary to its
continued industrial development. Even a developing nation as
wealthy as Korea could not open itself to the full temptations of the
consumer economies of Japan and the United States without disastrous results.
One major advantage of being a developing nation is that a developing nation can learn from mistakes made by developed nations.
For instance, consideration of the deteriorated national transportation system of the United States leads many Koreans to conclude
that Korea should not emulate the American "love affair" with the
automobile. Some Americans contend that it was a mistake to allow
such a development even in a country as geographically large as the
85. See generally W.
North-South division.

BRANDT, THE BRANDT COMMISSION

(1979) for a discussion of the
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United States."6 America's major cities underwent extensive social
disintegration: the rich migrated to the suburbs while the poor remained in the impoverished city core. The use of automobiles enables American laborers to work long distances from their homes.
Public transportation has deteriorated to the point that the automobile has become a necessity of life in the United States, and the poor
are left stranded.
Koreans want to avoid such a predicament. Furthermore, Korea
does not have sufficient land for the roads, shopping malls, fast food
restaurants, and all of the other industrial by-products of the automotive way of life. Additionally, Korea cannot afford the cost of oil
associated with heavy reliance of a country on automobiles.8 7 If Korea opened her markets to foreign automakers, she would shortly be
paying hundreds of millions of dollars and billions of yen in exchange for serious social problems.
Korea vigorously protects her infant industries' production of
socially desirable products. As a general rule, if Korea is able to
produce a product domestically, the product will not be imported. 8
As previously discussed, the author does not believe this policy is
justified with respect to nations much poorer than Korea. But what
about nations that are much richer than Korea, such as the United
States? At this juncture, it would seem that considerations of distributive justice and economic efficiency part company. Economic efficiency dictates that Korea not make what the United States can
make and sell in Korea more cheaply. Distributive justice, however,
would have Koreans produce such a product so that Korean workers,
not wealthier American workers, can profit from such production.
Infant Korean industries must also be protected. Perhaps a Rule
of Four or Five should govern the right of the poorer nation to erect
tariff barriers to the cheaper products of a richer one. Such a rule
would permit only a nation four or five times poorer than another to
levy tariffs on the wealthier nation's goods to encourage industrial
growth. In such a case, Korea would be justified in imposing tariffs
on products of the United States. 9
86. "Paved roads and streets have been added to the American landscape at the incredible rate of more than 200 miles per day, every single day for at least the last twenty years
. . .passenger miles traveled within the U.S. have been increasing at a rate six times faster
than the population for at least 25 years." A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 76 (1970).
87. But cf.Owen, Immobility: Barrierto Development, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON PUBLIC POLICY 30 (1965) (author suggests that closing the gap between immobile and mobile
nations would require, for example, Latin America, Africa and Asia to pave some 40,000,000
miles of road to reach the same ratio of road mileage to area that now prevails in the European Economic Community).
88. The necessity of gaining approval by MCI for all imported goods serves, as a practical matter, as an automatic restriction on the nature of goods that may be imported. See
supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
89. See Press Release, supra note 78, at 4.
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Historically, the United States has generally had a favorable
balance of trade with Korea. In the last two years, however, that
balance has shifted. It may in the future shift again in favor of the
United States. Exports from the United States to Korea are much
greater in volume than those from Korea to the United States, even
with the benefits of the GSP. The author, however, does not advocate that the balance of trade should be a critical factor in determining tariff relief between two nations. Since world trade is measured
on an international scale, nation A may have a negative balance of
trade with nation B, nation B may have a negative balance of trade
with nation C, and nation C may have a negative balance of trade
with nation A. If nation A penalizes B, B penalizes C, and C penalizes nation A, all suffer. Therefore, per capita GNP for a similar
measure of a nation's wealth should be the basis for determining
duty-free treatment between two nations.
The author has made speculations about international trade and
has created the Rule of Three in protest to Ambassador Brock's
comments that Korean industry has advanced to the stage where it
will be "graduated" from duty-free treatment.9 0 The author wants to
stress that although Korea may be among the richest of the poor
nations, and as such may itself owe a duty to even poorer nations,
Korea is very poor when compared to the United States. Korea has
done a great deal to help itself, and the United States has aided
Korea more than perhaps any other one nation has ever aided another. What happened to the vision that motivated this assistance?
Denial of GSP preference for a Korean export item such as
caulking guns or steel strand woven rope is reported on the back
pages of the Wall Street Journal. Such news makes the front page
of every daily newspaper in Korea, because such denial substantially
impacts the particular industry. The dollar amount of direct economic aid given by the United States to Korea makes the money at
stake in these tariff disputes seem miniscule. Such tariff disputes
consequently make the United States seem to many Koreans to be
like the host who lays out a magnificent dinner then tries to save a
few pennies at the end with a cheap dessert.
It is feared such a "cheap dessert" is indicative of future American international economic policy. Korea is in the vanguard of nations sufficiently strong enough to adversely impact segments of
United States industry, but it is still in need of assistance. Perhaps
the United States decision to terminate Korea from duty-free treatment is indicative of a future pattern of the Untied States responses
90. See generally Barringer & Dunn, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1979) (overview
of antidumping investigation procedures).
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to the economic advance of other developing nations. The United
States could either use her economic prowess to create an international economic order in which rich nations aid less wealthy nations
even at some expense to the richer nations, or it could react in a
protective manner. Adoption of the latter attitude by countries as
wealthy as the United States is shortsighted in that living and labor
standards around the world will eventually equalize. Free markets
and worldwide distributive justice will enable international economic
standards to equalize at a much higher level than under any other
conceivable alternative. The United States must choose its role in the
future international economic order.
2. Anti-dumping and CountervailingDuties.-Another source
of stress in United States-Korea trade relations is the problem of
dumping. Dumping occurs when imports are sold in the United
States market at "less than fair value" (LTFV). The President of
the United States may impose an additional duty to prevent dumping only if the International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent federal agency, determines that the alleged dumping is a substantial cause of material injury to domestic industry, and the
Commerce Department makes an independent determination that
dumping has occurred."' A key factor in determining whether dumping has occurred is the price for which that product sells in the developing nation. If the price is higher than the export price to the
United States, then, according to United States law, 92 a dumping
violation has occurred.
The problems surrounding dumping are more complex than
those related to the relief from duties under the United States GSP.
In the latter case, Korea simply wants to compete freely in the
American market without the burden of a duty, even though United
States industry may be damaged by such competition. In other
words, Korean manufacturers simply desire to compete on par with
United States businessmen. The argument is that if Koreans can
make a product cheaper, then United States consumers should get
the economic benefit of the lower price, and similarly that United
States workers should produce a commodity which a foreign competitor does not offer at a less expensive price. Segments of United
States industry may suffer, but worldwide economic efficiency will be
served with benefits to all United States consumers.
In contrast, the ban against dumping is viewed by Americans as
91. See Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §160-71 (1976); Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
92. See generally Takacs, Impediments to International Trade, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 9, 10-11 (1982).
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a prohibition of an unfair trade practice. The United States views
dumping prohibitions as being necessary to hold foreign businessmen
to American standards of fairness, not as penalizing foreigners for
being foreign. Dumping is deemed akin to predatory pricing, a
weapon used to unfairly drive competitors out of business, so that
prices may be increased. 93 Why else, say American businessmen,
would a Korean company sell its products at a lower cost overseas
than at home?
It must not be forgotten that Korea has gambled her future on
an economic strategy in which exports play the pre-eminent role. A
factory is built in Korea with the idea in mind that most of its output will be designated for the export market. For this reason, it
makes sense to price such output lower in foreign markets than in
domestic markets. 9 Prices may be set higher by the Korean government to discourage domestic consumption and to make more of the
product available for export. Prices may also be set higher domestically to reflect domestic consumers' willingness to pay for what they
recognize as a quality brand name and to offset the costs of exporting and selling abroad. These measures are regarded as dumping
under American law.
The best economic argument against dumping is that although
there may be a temporary benefit to the consumer, that benefit cannot continue since the dumped goods are being sold at prices which
cannot yield the manufacturer a profit over time. United States manufacturers and workers are consequently injured and perhaps even
driven out of business, and then prices are later raised. 5 The evil of
predatory pricing or dumping, as seen through American eyes, is
that it really does not represent a lower price, but only a temporarily
lower price designed to drive out competition.
Suppose, however, that Korea is willing to continue to export
steel wire rope at the same low price for a number of years, or that
there is other foreign competition that will keep the price down?
Suppose the people of Korea are willing to finance the low dumping
price by themselves paying a higher price. What is the objection to
dumping, except a desire to protect American workers from severe
competition? Rather than basing the decision to impose dumping duties by considering domestic prices in the Korean market, it might
93. See Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises & the Antidumping Law, 20 HARV.
L.J. 277, 279-80 (1979).
94. See Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing & Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 47 (1958) in which
Viner's categorization of this type of dumping as "persistent" is compared to "intermittent,"
which involves the more or less frequent and planned sale of goods abroad at prices below
those charged to domestic buyers, and "sporadic," which is occasional and unforeseen.
95. Id. at 47.
INT'L
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make more sense to ask whether the low prices are temporary only,
or whether they represent long term delivery of the product at the
same low or negative profit margin.
The salient issue is whether the low dumping price (that is, a
lower export price than the domestic price in Korea) is a permanent
benefit or a temporary expediency. If other foreign competition or
easy re-entry into the market by American companies will prevent a
subsequent price rise, or if the Korean Government or Korean company is willing to guarantee the.dumping price for a reasonable time,
the purpose of any objection to dumping can only be to protect the
American market."' This argument can be similarly applied to countervailing duty cases where the triggering factor is subsidization of
the foreign competitor by its government.
B.

United States Laws Benefiting Consumers

1. American Products Liability Law.-The modern American
products liability lawsuit in the years ahead will come as a major
shock to Korean companies, especially as smaller companies not associated with the big trading houses export more and more to the
United States.
American products liability law is unique in several respects.
First, it is essentially law made not by government bureaucrats or by
legislatures, but by judges and juries. It may be one of the last major
areas of development of the common law.97 Second, products liability
awards seem premised on an almost Protestant sense of responsibility. Some American courts and legal scholars see products liability
law as essentially a departure from notions of individual fault. 8
Moreover, one of the major criticisms of products liability law is that
it often assumes that fault is not the main issue.9 9 American plaintiffs attorneys claim that unless the jury blames the corporate defendant, in other words, unless they think the corporation did something
it should not have done, there is no chance of a damages award of
any considerable size. 00 The notion, however, of a powerful company paying millions of dollars to an unfortunate individual dam96. Id. at 47-48.
97. "In the 1970's, strict liability theories have become the paramount basis of liability
for manufacturers of products. Moreover, the development of the strict liability basis has produced the largest caselaw explosion in the history of the law of torts." W. PROSSER, J. WADE,
V. SCHWARTZ, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 737 (1982).
98. For the view that products liability judgments are essentially risk-spreading devices
that operate without regard to questions of fault, see the classic opinion of Justice Traynor in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). Attacks on
products liability law also often assume that fault is not the main issue.
99. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978).
100. For a thorough discussion of punitive awards, see Owen, Punitive Damages in Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257 (1976).
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aged by one of its products, and having the amount of damages determined by twelve laypersons, is as incomprehensible to a Korean as
is the attitude that a lawsuit is a shameful way to settle a dispute to
an American.
Americans view themselves as bearers of legal rights, and consequently they use law to order society. Korean society, on the other
hand, is ordered by custom and tradition. Legal measure is used only
to remedy disorders that can be handled in no other manner. Koreans would not blame the corporation in the same way an American
jury would. An accident is viewed in Korea as an incident of bad
luck or ill fortune, something Koreans accept more readily than
Americans. There is no Captain Ahab in Korean literature, and no
deep seated need in Koreans to strike out at a corporate Moby Dick
when a consumer loses his leg or has half his body burned by a flammable nightgown. For Koreans accidents and ill-fortune are not
something that God or General Motors must justify to the victim;
they are simply part of the natural order of things.
Third, under American law, trading companies and dealers are
frequently as liable as the manufacturer." °1 It therefore behooves a
Korean company exporting products to America to routinely include
in any contract a clause requiring the American importer or retailer
to defend any products liability claim against the Korean company,
and to indemnify it for any judgment it is forced to pay.102 Korean
exporters should not rely on the inability of an American court to
secure jurisdiction over the Korean defendant. The long arm statutes
of most of the American states and current interpretations of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution normally allow jurisdiction over any Korean
company involved in exporting to the United States.' 0 3 Even if the
Korean company itself worked through independent agents in the
United States, that independence may be discounted by United
States courts and the actions of the agent deemed those of the
manufacturer."0 4
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1977). See also, Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964), in which the court
notes that retailers may be the only member of an enterprise available to suit by the injured
plaintiff. The court also suggests that retailers may play a substantial role in insuring a product's safety by pressuring manufacturers to produce safer products.
102. See generally Coccia, Getting Others to Assume or Share the Loss: A Discussion
of Indemnity and Contribution, 17 TRIAL LAWYERS GUIDE 179, 180-83 (1973) (discussion of
express indemnity clauses in product liability context).
103. "Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
(1945). See generally Sutterfield, In Personam Jurisdiction- How long is the "Long Arm"
in Products Liability, 1980 INS. L.J. 447 (1980).
104. See Coons v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 176 N.J. Super 575, 424 A.2d 446 (1980), in
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With regard to enforcement of a judgment in the United States,
an American court's willingness to seize assets will surprise Korean
businessmen.' 0 5 In Korea, a respectable company would proceed to
actual litigation only with the utmost reluctance. If it lost in court,
the company would almost certainly pay voluntarily if it possibly
could. Attachment is thus not a customary procedure in Korea. This
is not true in the United States, where the American courts seize
broad classes of assets at a moment's notice.
The enforcement of United States judgments in Korean courts
is virgin territory. There are no cases on record. An American litigant should consider litigating in Korean courts as a last resort, especially in an area as novel to Korean law as American products
liability law. The pitfalls are numerous. For example, under Korean
law a final judgment of a foreign court is valid only if, "the judgment of the foreign court is not incompatible with public order or
good morals in Korea.' 0 6 Given the inconsistency between American products liability law and the Korean legal mind, the Korean
ideals of public order and good morals might be deemed by a Korean
court to be incompatible with a million dollar judgment for damage
10 7
to one person by a defective product, however grave the damage.
2. American Antitrust Law.-American antitrust law is premised on the theory that free and open competition most efficiently
allocates economic resources and maximizes consumer benefit. Antitrust law seeks to prevent anticompetitive behavior and excessive
concentrations of economic power.' 8
In contrast, the Korean Government, in addition to supporting
the heavily concentrated structure of Korean industry described
above, often takes action aimed at reducing what it considers to be
excessive competition in both the domestic and overseas markets.
This action has consisted of both jawboning, 0 9 and concrete directives which, for example, limit the number of companies which may
compete in any one field, such as automobiles." 0 The rationale for
which jurisdiction was based on the active relationship between a foreign motorcycle manufacturer and its exclusive distributor which ensured sale of the foreign corporation's products. See
generally L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 3A PRODUCTS LIABILITY §45.01-.03 (1983).
105. "There are some jurisdictions, notably the northeastern states, where practically all
collection actions are commenced by attachment." R. NEEDHAM & L. POLLACK, COLLECTING
CLAIMS & ENFORCING JUDGMENTS 135 (1969).
106. See Art. 203 of the Korean Code of Civil Procedure. See also, Arts. 476 & 477;
Kong-Woong Choe, Jurisdiction in Korean Conflict of Laws, in BUSINESS LAWS IN KOREA:
INVESTMENT, TAXATION & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 108 (1982).
107. See Kwang Ha Ko, The Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in Korea (unpublished paper on file at the firm of Lee & Ko, Seoul, Korea).
108. See generally J. VAN CISE & W. LIFLAND, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST
LAWS (8th ed. 1980).
109. See Korea Times, July 25, 1982.
110. It is a common practice, though not one specifically authorized by statute, for the
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this government intervention is that in some domestic industries the
relatively small size of the market precludes more than a limited
number of competing companies. In overseas markets, excessive
competition is discouraged because of its chilling effect on profits
and the potential for dumping that such competition produces. Contrary to the attitude in the United States, fierce, unbridled competition is not considered a positive notion by the Korean Government,
by Korean businesses, or by Koreans in general.
The combination of a social attitude tolerant of concentrated
power, and of a government policy of encouraging economic concentration while discouraging excessive competition, does not prepare
the Korean businessman to understand the fundamentally opposite
attitude and policies underlying American antitrust law. The average
Korean businessman would be astounded to learn that under United
States law an agreement to restrain competition by agreeing on
prices' or market division" 12 is per se illegal' 13 and could subject
the violator to treble damages in favor of private parties, as well as
to criminal charges by the United States Government. The astonishment would be compounded by his learning that these laws could be
applied to both his conduct and that of his competitors which occurred solely in Korea, so long as such conduct had a direct effect on
United States markets." 4
It should be noted at this juncture that many sectors of Korean
industry have formed associations to coordinate the activities of the
members to prevent excessive competition leading to unprofitable export prices." 5 The associations also coordinate responses to restrictions imposed on Korean exports by foreign countries, and to promote the products of association members. In effect, the associations
assume a role similar to the MCI in trying to ensure the orderly
exploitation of export markets. A potential problem with the internal
regulatory activities of these associations, and of other informal
MCI to limit the number of Korean companies bidding for foreign contracts. In this area,
GTC's are given preferential treatment.
11l. E.g., U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (proscribed price fixing
between competitors regardless of the good intentions of the defendants).
112. E.g., U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (landmark case
which ruled against market division).
113. See J. TOWNSEND, EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST: THE SHERMAN ACT & U.S.
BUSINESS ABROAD, 38 (1980), in which the author discusses the rationale of the per se rule.
Some types of agreements or business practices are conclusively presumed to produce an unreasonable restraint of trade because the question of whether a business practice has had an ill
effect on competition is too difficult to resolve in a judicial proceeding. Therefore, no inquiry
need be made into economic data or factual circumstance to determine reasonableness.
114. See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), which established that a state can impose liabilities where conduct abroad has illegal domestic consequences. See also, J. TOWNSEND, EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST: THE SHERMAN ACT & U.S.
BUSINESS ABROAD, 40-81 (1980) for a thorough discussion of precedent leading to jurisdiction.
115. E.g., toy makers, textile manufacturers, and electronics manufacturers.
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agreements among manufacturers, is the vulnerability of such arrangements to attack under the American antitrust laws.
Antitrust, therefore, is a potentially hazardous area for Koreans
trading with the United States, although at this time the author
knows of no American antitrust proceedings against Korean companies arising from anticompetitive activity in the area of trade. There
seems to be little doubt, however, that many of the practices of Korean companies are per se violations of the American antitrust laws.
In response, many Korean companies could assert the defense that
their behavior was ordered by the Korean Government. 1 '
In the area of antitrust, it is incumbent upon the United States
to rethink its position on free and open competition. It should not, on
the one hand, enforce the antitrust laws against anticompetitive
agreements between companies from developing countries on
grounds of economic efficiency and benefit to the consumer while, on
the other hand, it negotiates voluntary restrictions on exports by
those nations and contemplates measures to protect Untied States
business. The United States either does or does not want free competition. American management and labor unions are trying to protect
privileges that are as economically unjustified as were the monopoly
profits of the oil and tobacco trusts at the turn of the century.
VI.

Conclusion

Despite discussion of difficulties in United States-Korean trade
relations, it must be stressed that trade relations between the two
nations have been relatively smooth, as evidenced by the explosive
growth in trade between the United States and Korea over the past
decade. United States-Korean trade relations are in fact becoming
increasingly problem free. The Korean Government has been accelerating the rate at which it is decontrolling the Korean economy.
Such decontrol is occurring not because freedom of enterprise is
seen, as it is in the United States, as a good in itself. Rather, the
Korean Government realizes that not second guessing responsible
businessmen results in economic efficiency and the superior allocation of resources. The Government's net of review and approval has
been allowed to become more informal, so that smaller transactions
are less rigorously scrutinized.
The major stumbling blocks to open and vigorous trade are increasingly the result of American plans, rather than because of Korean strategy. It is Americans who need to be less bureaucratic, less
law-bound, more adaptable and flexible. The Yankee sea captains
116. See InterAmerican Refining Corp v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291
(D. Del. 1970), in which the court permitted defendants to defend against a boycott action on
the grounds that the boycott had been compelled by the Venezuelan Government.
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who opened the China trade with the West 180 years ago were, in
many ways, less culturally provincial, more imaginative, and more
committed to free trade than their current American descendants.
The stakes are enormous. The author, along with many others,
believes that the Far East, especially the Confucian Far East consisting of China, Korea, and Japan, will be the cutting edge of the world
economy for at least the next fifty years. The continued prosperity of
the United States depends on its being in full partnership with that
cutting edge, not on its dragging its heels in opposition. The United
States' geography, history, and temperament render it the natural
economic ally of the Confucian Far East. The problems discussed in
this overview are minor and readily solved if the larger picture is
kept in mind. The possibilities and opportunities presented by United
States-Korean trade are a major part of that picture. The problems
flowing through United States-Korean trade relations are rivers easily bridged.

